地方政府竞争:财政赤字扩张及其攀比效应——来自县域的证据

A Study on Local Government Competition Focused on Fiscal Deficits Expansion and Competitive Effect, Based on the Evidences from Counties

地方政府竞争呈现阶段性特征,从廉价土地出让转化为依靠财政赤字膨胀和债务扩张。采用广东省及其相邻省区的沿边县域数据进行实证分析,结果表明:(1)地方政府间财政赤字存在"攀比效应",县域财政赤字呈现逐年攀升的趋势,相邻县域的空间溢出效果明显;(2)财政分权效应对财政赤字影响显著为正,地方政府呈现主动负债的特征;(3)县域经济发展水平对财政赤字影响显著,人均GDP较低的地区表现出对经济发展"不平等"的厌恶,其财政行为表现为明显的"赶超"冲动;(4)产业结构水平对地方政府财政赤字的影响具有双重性,呈现路径依赖效应。

The competition of local government presents periodical features which have been changing from the cheap land leasing to the ballooning fiscal deficits and debt expansion. This paper empirically analyzes the factors that lead to the fiscal deficits expansion, by using the county level data from Guangdong Province and the other provinces with adjacent boundaries. The main conclusions have been obtained as follows.(1) The fiscal deficits of county governments have the competitive effect, which has increased year by year since the tax reform in1994, with the obvious spatial spillover effect among the neighboring counties.( 2) There is the significantly positive relationship between the fiscal decentralization and the fiscal deficits, which lead to the active liability among local government.( 3) The economic development has a vital effect on fiscal deficits. The areas with lower GDP per capital show the inequality aversion to economic growth, so their financial policies obviously rely on catch-up motivation.(4) The industrial structure has a dual influence on the fiscal deficits of local govern-ments.