环境污染群体性事件的扩展式演化博弈模型

Extensive Evolutionary Game Model of Environmental Pollution Mass Incident

近年来全国各地频发的环境污染群体性事件严重影响到社会稳定。考虑化工企业立项决策与周边居民抗议行动的斯塔克伯格博弈,构建了环境污染群体性事件的扩展式演化博弈模型。由于扩展式演化博弈均衡求解的困难,考虑参与者的心智模型后简化了求解过程。比较怀特流形演化解和心智模型演化解,研究发现,两种演化解均反映博弈双方在稳定状态下的策略选择,但是心智模型演化解更贴近于实际情况。最后,结合大连福佳大化PX事件案例,比较了怀特流形演化解和心智模型演化解的均衡求解结果。

Environmental pollution mass incidents often occurring all over the country have seriously influenced the social stability. Considering the Stackberg game model between petrochemical enterprises and nearby residents, the paper builds the extensive evolutionary game model of environmental pollution mass incident. Because of the difficulty to solve the equilibrium of extensive evolutionary game, the player＇s mental model is considered that can simplify the solving course. Comparing the Wright Manifold evolutionary solution to the Mental Model evolutionary solution of the model, the results show that two solutions of evolutionary equilibrium can all reflect the strategy selection under the equilibrium state. However, the Mental Model evolutionary solution more closes to the fact. Lastly, based on the Dalian PX incident, the paper analyzes the two types of equilibrium outcomes of the Wright Manifold evolutionary solution to the Mental Model evolutionary solution.