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基于信息不对称视域医患矛盾风险及防控 被引量:11

Research on the Doctor- patient Contradiction and Control Risk Based on Asymmetric Information Horizon
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摘要 信息不对称是医患双方信息掌握的不均衡状态,它是医疗服务市场中最重要的特征。医患双方信息不对称易引发道德风险、信任风险和逆向选择风险,从而可能导致医患矛盾升级为医患冲突。缓解医患矛盾,需打破医患双方之间的信息不均衡状态,通过合理配置医疗资源,改革公立医院的管理体制与逐利机制,创新医疗补偿支付方式,引入第三方调解机制,完善社会医疗保障制度,并构建医疗风险防控机制。 Information asymmetry means disequilibrium information state between doctors and the patients, h is the most important features in medical service market. Information asymmetry may cause moral risk, trust risk and adverse selection risk, which may cause the doctor -patient contradiction upgrade for the doctor -patient conflicts. To ease the doctor -patient contradiction, it is necessary to break and alleviate the information disequilibrium between doctor and patient. Through the rational allocation of medical resources, reform the management system of public hospitals and their profit - seeking mechanism, innovative medical compensation payment, add the introduction of the third party mediation mechanism, and perfect the security system, prevention and control of risks to reduce the doctor - patient contradiction, then the construction of a harmonious doctor - patient relationship will come.
作者 李晚莲
出处 《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期47-50,共4页 Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
基金 国家社会科学基金项目"新型农村合作医疗可持续发展研究"(11BJL038) 湖南省社科基金项目"湖南省城乡人口老龄化对医疗卫生支出政策的影响研究"(13zdb065)阶段性成果
关键词 医疗服务 信息不对称 医患矛盾风险 风险防控 medical service information asymmetry doctor - patient contradiction prevention and control risk
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