摘要
为促进工业生态链发展,有效减少资源消耗和废弃物排放,构建了政府、工业生态链上下游核心企业间的三阶段序贯博弈模型,研究了政府财政补贴下工业生态链上核心企业的均衡定价策略。采用逆序推断的方法,求解了三阶博弈模型的均衡解,并分析了政府财政补贴对工业生态链核心企业产品定价和副产品交易价格的影响。研究表明,财政补贴可以改善社会总福利和工业生态链的利润。同时,政府采取仅对下游核心企业补贴的策略更优。
Aiming at promoting the development of industrial ecological chain,and reduce the resource consumption and wastes emission effectively,an equilibrium pricing strategy for the core enterprises in an industrial ecological chain is studied based on a developed three-stage sequential game model for the government,upstream and downstream core enterprises under the financial subsides.The backward induction（BI）approach is used to obtain the equilibrium solutions.Subsequently,the impact of the financial subsides on the enterprises＇ optimal prices and of the by-product＇s optimal price is analyzed.The conclusion implies that the financial subsides can improve social welfare and promote the system profit of the ecological chain.Meanwhile,it is better for the government to provide the subsides just for the downstream enterprise.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第8期105-110,共6页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(71301179)
教育部人文社科基金青年项目(20100092120041)
现代物流重庆市重点实验室开放基金资助项目(CQKLL12004)
关键词
工业生态链
财政补贴
序贯博弈
定价策略
Industrial Ecological Chain
Financial Subsides
Sequential Game
Pricing Strategy
