控制大股东侵占与企业投融资决策研究

Research on Controlling Shareholder's Occupation Behavior and the Company's Investment and Financing Decisions

基于中国上市公司股权高度集中且控制大股东不积极参与权益再融资的现实背景,借鉴动态公司财务的相关研究成果,采用实物期权方法,在理论上构建基于控制大股东侵占并内生化了控制大股东持股比例、破产成本、税收因素的企业投融资决策的动态模型,探索控制大股东侵占对企业投融资决策的内在作用机理。通过设定合理范围的参数,使用Matlab工具对模型进行具体的数值模拟和分析。研究结果表明,控制大股东的侵占行为会导致企业的投资时机和违约时机提前,并引发过度投资和过度负债;与积极的控制大股东相比,消极控制大股东的侵占行为对企业投融资决策的扭曲作用更大。加强对中小投资者利益的保护以及鼓励或者诱使控制大股东积极参与权益再融资是改善控制大股东过度投资和过度负债的有效路径。

Most researches and findings on relationship between controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior and the efficiency of company＇s investment and financing decisions are of empirical results. In theoretical researches, the existing researches of the controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior are discussed from the perspective of corporate governance, focusing on the internal mechanism of how corporate governance influences or inhibits controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior. However, there are few researches discussing the influential mechanism between controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior and a company＇s in- vestment and financing decisions. Meanwhile, more theoretical studies on the controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior are discussed from the static perspective rather than from the dynamic perspective. Given the context that the ownership structures of the listed companies in China are highly concentrated and the controlling shareholders do not actively participate in equity refinancing, this paper draws on the related researches on the dynamic corporate finance and uses the real options approach to theoretically construct a dynamic investment and financing model under controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior. In this model, controlling shareholder＇s ownership,corporate＇s bankruptcy cost and tax benefit are endogenous factors. This research aims to explore the inherent influential mechanism of controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior on corporate investment and financing decisions. Furthermore, by setting reasonable ranges of parameters we use the tool of Matlab to carry out numerical simulations and expand the detailed analyses so as to quantifiably reveal the influential degrees of the key factors. From the results of dynamic model and numerical simulation, we find that： controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior will lead to early investment and early default, and it will cause over-investment and over-debt ; compared with the active controlling shareholders, distortions in investment and financing decisions caused by passive controlling shareholders＇ occupation behavior are larger. However, our results suggest that once we introduced the institutional factors such as inadequate investor protection and control- ling shareholder＇s occupation behavior into MM＇s ideal model, the ownership structure will then influence the company＇s dynamic investment and financing decisions. That is, the owner ship of controlling shareholders and the initiative of controlling sharehold- ers to participate in equity refinancing will have influences on the company＇s investment and financing decisions. From our find- ings in this paper, we argue that there are effective methods to reduce the company＇s over-investment and over-debt caused by controlling shareholder＇s occupation behavior, and the methods include improving the legal protection of investors, encouraging or forcing controlling shareholders to actively participate in equity refinancing.