摘要
当前中国基层社会的冲突解决中,"花钱买稳定"成为地方政府维稳的典型策略。它是指地方政府以经济利益的妥协换取所需要的稳定,避免当事方通过持续性行动制造不稳定的操作方法。这种策略嵌入在中国社会背景下政府与个人间的保姆型关系中,是政府"不出事"逻辑与民众"会要挟"逻辑通过不断博弈最终达成合意的结果。它被很多地方政府视为冲突解决的万能良药,也确实起到了一些积极的作用。不过,它的消极性更加显著,难以成为良好的冲突解决范例。因此,如何在冲突解决中走出"花钱买稳定"的怪圈是地方政府需要尽快克服的难题。
Buying stability has become a typical strategy for the local government to safeguard stability in resolving grassroots conflicts.It is a way in which the local government exchanges the stability it needs with the compromise of economic interests so that the disputing party will stop creating continuous unrest.This strategy,embedded in the baby-sitter relationship between the government and the individual in China,is the game result between government's logic of non-accident and the individual's logic of being good at intimidating.In practice,more and more local governments have taken it as a panacea in conflict resolution and it does work somehow.However,this should not be a good way to resolve conflicts because of the obvious negative effects.Thus,we should learn to get out of the vicious cycle of"buying stability".
出处
《吉首大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2015年第5期96-101,共6页
Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(13AGL005)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2014WB19
2014XT07)
关键词
“花钱买稳定”
冲突解决
地方政府
"buying stability"
conflict resolution
local government