监管独立性、市场化进程与国企高管晋升机制的执行效果——基于2003～2012年国企高管职位变更的数据

Regulatory Independence, Market-oriented Process and the Implementation of Executives 'Promotion Mechanism in SOEs — Based on the SOE Executives Turnover Data from 2003 to 2012

国企高管职位晋升机制是国企高管激励的重要制度安排，其执行效果直接影响激励效力。本文手工整理了2003～2012年中央与各级地方国企董事长、总经理及党委书记离任后的去向及升降数据，并基于各级国资委对所辖国企高管绩效考核的规定，首次探究了国企高管职位晋升评价机制的执行效果及其有效执行的前提条件。研究发现，央企高管晋升依赖业绩表现及个人能力；而地方省属和市县级国企高管在政治锦标赛的约束下，依赖非业绩的政治关系资源或政策性负担的承担而获得晋升，晋升评价机制在央企和地方国企被差异化执行，即监管独立性影响晋升机制的执行效果。此外，相较于市场化水平较低的中西部地区，东部地区的国企高管晋升机制相对有效执行。

The executives 'job promotion mechanism in state-owned enterprise(SOE) is an important executives 'incentive arrangement, of which the implementation directly affects the incentive effect. We manually collected the turnover and promotion data of SOE executives from central enterprises as well as local SOEs at all levels from 2003 to 2012. Based on those data and the performance evaluation regulations regarding the SOE executives set by SASACs, we 're the first to study the implementation and prerequisite of the executives 'promotion mechanism in SOEs. We find that the executives from central enterprises get promoted depending on their performance and capabilities, whereas executives from local SOEs realize their promotion by their political connections and policy burden they beared under the pressure of rank-order tournament among local government officials. The executives 'promotion mechanism is implemented differently between central enterprises and local SOEs, which means regulatory independence does affect how the mechanism works. Be-sides, compared to SOE executives in Central and Western Regions where the level of marketization is lower, the implementation of executives 'promotion mechanism in SOEs of Eastern Region works better.