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中国风险投资机构联合投资动机的影响因素研究 被引量:1

Motivating Factors for Chinese Venture Capital Firms to Syndicate
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摘要 运用中国风险投资市场5316条风险投资数据,以欧美国家市场联合投资的动机为参考,结合中国的法律、政策、文化环境研究中国风险投资机构参与联合投资动机的影响因素。结果发现,融资规模大、外资机构参与以及向高新技术企业投资,出于规避风险和整合资源的考虑较倾向于采用联合投资方式;获利期阶段项目的投资,则出于IPO等因素考虑更倾向于联合投资。这表明中国风险投资市场联合投资的动机与欧美国家相比,会受到制度和市场环境的影响而有所差异。 Based on modern portfolio investment theory, motivations of syndication for VC firms in western countries as well as special laws, regulations and culture environments in China, this paper utilizes 5316 VC investments in China to ex- plore the motivating factors for Chinese venture capital firms to syndicate. The empirical results show that when it involves a large scale of financing, foreign participation and investment in high-tech enterprises, Chinese VC firms prefer to use the syn- dication investment. It is also proved that the financial motivations of syndication for Chinese VC firms are similar to that in the west ; However, as for motivations closely related to laws, regulations and cultural background of the country, Chinese VC firms act quite differently when deciding whether or not to syndicate.
作者 谈毅 杜雪川
出处 《财经论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第10期41-47,共7页 Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173146 71273166) 深圳市科技研发资金软科学研究项目(项目名称:深圳科技金融模式创新研究)
关键词 风险投资 联合投资 LOGIT模型 动机 venture capital syndication Logit model motivations
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参考文献13

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