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集群式供应链战略联盟的稳定性演化博弈分析 被引量:1

Game Analysis on the Stability of the Evolution of Cluster Supply Chain Strategic Alliance
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摘要 集群式供应链战略联盟是集群式供应链思想与战略联盟理论耦合的结果,具备了两者的动态复杂、竞合博弈、战略协同、可约束性等正面特征,同时也拥有有限理性、恶性竞争、机会主义等负面特征。因此,研究其内部成员间的关系,对于联盟的管理和维护有着重要意义。运用演化博弈理论的演化稳定策略(ESS),可以清晰展示出个体加入联盟的内在原因,也可以对联盟运作过程中成员之间的资源策略及其对应的收益与成本作出深刻的剖析,进而为联盟稳固运行提供改进的方向。 Cluster supply chain strategy alliance is the result of the coupling of the idea of cluster supply chain and the theory of strategic alliance. It has the positive characteristics of dynamic complex, competition game, strategic synergy, binding property, etc. At the same time also has limited rationality, vicious competition, and negative characteristics of opportunism. Therefore, research the relationship between the internal members has great significance to the management and maintenance of alliance. Using evolutionary game theory of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), can clearly show the internal causes why individuals join the alliance. It can also make a deep analysis be between the members of the alliance with the operation of the resource strategy and its corresponding benefits and costs, and then provide improvement in the direction of the alliance stable running.
作者 袁科峰
机构地区 宁德师范学院
出处 《廊坊师范学院学报(自然科学版)》 2015年第5期69-74,共6页 Journal of Langfang Normal University(Natural Science Edition)
基金 福建省教育厅中青年教师教育科研项目(社科B类)(JBS14225) 宁德师范学院服务海西建设人文社科类项目:服务闽东区域经济和产业发展专题项目(2012H321)
关键词 集群式供应链战略联盟 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 不稳定性 cluster supply chain strategy alliance evolutionary game evolutionary stable strategy instability
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