制造商公平关切对闭环供应链运作效率的影响分析

Impact of Manufacturer's Fairness Concern on Operational Performance of Closed-loop Supply Chains

针对零售商主导和第三方主导的闭环供应链系统存在的问题,在考虑制造商公平关切的基础上,建立了3种回收模式下的5个Stackelberg博弈模型,通过求解和比较不同决策情形下的最优价格、最优回收率和成员利润,分析了制造商的公平关切程度对最优决策和利润分配的影响。研究表明,当被关切者从事回收时,公平关切倾向会降低回收效率、消费者福利和闭环供应链的总体效益;制造商主导和零售商主导优于第三方主导的情形;渠道主导者不希望公平关切者将全部关注度集中于自身,而希望其将部分关注度转移至其他决策者。

Based on retailer-leading and third party-leading closed-loop supply chains and three kinds of different reverse patterns,five Stackelberg game models are established consideration fairness concern of the manufacturer.The optimal prices,the optimal collection rates and the profits of different channel members in five models are derived and compared.Effect of the manufacturer＇s fairness concern degrees on optimal decisions was analyze.The results show that the behavior of fairness concerns will decreases the optimal collection rates,the consumer welfare and the profits of the closed-loop supply chain when those concerns engaged in recycling;Manufacturer-leading and retailer-leading are superior to third party-leading;The leading of the channel do not want the fairness concerns concentrate all the attention to its own,and hope that the fairness concerns could transfer some attention to other decision makers.