契约视角下PPP项目寻租行为与激励监督模型

Motivation and Supervision Mechanism and Rent Seeking of Project Company Based on Contract Theory

在PPP项目中,项目公司的行为可以分为有利于项目绩效的履约行为和不利于项目绩效的寻租行为,基于委托代理理论分析了项目公司两种行为与政府激励机制、监督惩罚力度之间的博弈关系及其对项目绩效的影响。研究表明,项目公司寻租与否是在寻租边际收益、激励水平和监督惩罚力度三者之间权衡的结果,进一步研究发现在满足政府收益最大化的条件下仅仅依靠激励监督机制是不能完全消除项目公司的寻租行为的,但政府部门可以通过强化惩罚力度来抑制项目公司的寻租行为。

The behavior of project company in government investment project can be separated in- to two forms, one is beneficial to the projects construction and the other is bad to project construc- tion. This paper analyze the relationships among the following factors, that is the two different be- havior forms,incentive level, supervision-punishment level and company performance. The result demonstrates that in the condition of imperfect information, whether project company will specu- late is a trade-off among marginal speculation revenue, incentive level and supervision-punish- ment level. Further research show that the rent-seeking activity of project company can not be e- liminated through incentive only with the goal of maxing enterprises revenue, one of the ways to stop speculation is to intensify the degree of punishment.