国家重点生态功能区转移支付动态激励效应分析

Dynamic Incentive Effect Analysis of Transfer Payment in National Key Ecological Function Zone

中央政府对国家重点生态功能区所在县级政府提供转移支付是解决生态环境保护成本与生态效益的区域错配问题的重要措施。转移支付制度的实施实质上体现了中央政府和县级政府之间的委托代理关系,中央政府作为委托人和作为代理人的县级政府签订一个长期的生态保护与生态补偿转移支付契约。中央政府可以依据县级政府生态保护的努力程度和生态环境的质量状况对县级政府进行考核和奖罚,以激励县级政府对生态保护投入更多的努力。文章以国家重点生态功能区转移支付实施为例,通过引入上一期的生态效益产出,构建了中央政府和县级政府生态保护的动态委托代理模型,对生态保护中的中央政府和县级政府行为选择进行理论分析,求出县级政府的最优努力程度、中央政府的最优激励支付比率和相应的生态效益产出水平。理论分析结果表明:一是转移支付能够有效激励县级政府的生态环境努力,对生态环境质量的改善起到了显著的作用;二是县级政府风险规避程度的增加提高了其生态环境保护的努力投入,同样能够促进生态环境质量的提高;三是中央政府应重视对县级政府生态环境保护的长效激励,制定合理的激励方式和激励水平,将生态效益产出和生态环境质量统一纳入县级政府的生态保护政绩考核体系中。最后,根据本文的研究,提出了三个针对性的政策建议:一是完善国家重点生态功能区的生态补偿激励考核与监督机制;二是增强对国家重点生态功能区县级政府的一般性财政转移支付和横向财政转移支付,增加县级政府财政收入;三是改进以GDP为核心的政绩考核制度,明确县级政府社会福利包含经济增长和生态环境保护两部分,并逐步提高生态环境保护的比重。本文的研究不仅有利于国家重点生态功能区转移支付实施成果的巩固及持续推进,还具有一定的理论价值。

The transfer payment to national key ecological function zone is an important measure to solve the regional fault between the cost and ecological benefit of ecological environmental protection. The transfer payment system reflects the principal-agent relationship between the central government and the county government,as the principal. The central government signed a long-term contract about ecological protection and ecological compensation transfer payment with the county government,as the agent. The central government can reward and punish county government according to ecological protection effort and ecological environment quality status,to motivate the county government to input more efforts for ecological protection. Taking the transfer payment to national key ecological function zone as the object of study,the paper structures the dynamic principal-agent model of the central government and the county government by introducing the output of ecological benefits of the previous period,theoretically analyses behavior choice of the central government and county government,and finds out the optimal effort level of the county government,the optimal incentive payout ratio of the central government and the corresponding ecological benefit output level. The theoretical analysis results show that： first,the transfer payment can effectively motivate the county government＇s ecological environment efforts and play a significant role for the improvement of the ecological environment quality; second,increase of the degree of risk aversion of the county government can improve their ecological environment protection efforts,and promote the improvement of the ecological environment quality as the same; third,the central government should pay attention to long-term incentive to the county government,formulate reasonable incentive mode and incentive level,and incorporate the ecological benefit output and ecological environment quality into ecological protection performance evaluation system. Finally,according to the research of the paper, three policy suggestions are put forward： to, improve the ecological compensation incentive assessment and supervision mechanism of national key ecological function zone; to enhance the general financial transfer payments and horizontal financial transfer payments to increasing county government revenue; to improve the performance evaluation system as the core of GDP,to define two parts of the social welfare of the county level,including economic growth and ecological environment protection,and gradually to improve the proportion of ecological environment protection. The research can not only consolidate implementation results of the transfer payment of national key ecological function zone,but also have some theoretical value.