财政竞争对中国环境质量的影响机理及对策研究

Influential Mechanism of Fiscal Competition on Environmental Quality and Countermeasures

财政竞争是影响环境质量的重要因素之一,但是,理论界已有文献鲜有以财政竞争为视角来分析环境质量的研究成果。本文从竞争主体、竞争动因和竞争方式三个方面阐释了财政竞争的内涵,并基于公共品定义角度分析了环境质量的特征,表现为具有辖区性、区域性和全国性的多重特性,为政府介入环境质量改善提供了理论依据。在此基础上,本文立足于"纵向财政竞争"和"横向财政竞争"二维分析视角,通过逻辑分析、博弈论等方法对财政竞争影响中国环境质量的内在机理进行了剖析。研究结论表明:由于"纵向财政竞争",中国政府间存在财政收入与财政支出责任不对称、转移支付制度设计不合理、财政"利维坦"倾向等制度设计缺陷,从而挤压了环境质量改善的财力投入;由于"横向财政竞争",中国各级政府间为追求自身可支配财力的最大化,在环境质量问题上陷入"污染博弈"、"财力投入博弈"和"污染行为矫正博弈"等博弈困境。在缺乏有效的外部约束规则下,最终呈现的是非合作博弈均衡状态,表现为地方政府间竞相懈怠环境质量改善主体责任。因此,无论是"纵向财政竞争",还是"横向财政竞争",均对中国环境质量产生了不同程度的负面效应。对此,必须清晰政府间环境质量责任主体、加大环境保护的转移支付力度、构建科学完善的环境税(费)体系、建立以质量为导向的政绩考核机制,促使中国政府间的财政竞争行为回归理性,保证财政竞争与环境质量二者间形成良性循环,以确保环境质量。

Fiscal competition is one of the important factors affecting environmental quality. However,the existing literature seldom analyzes environmental quality from the perspective of fiscal competition. From the main subject,incentive and mode of competition,this paper explains fiscal competition and analyzes the characteristics of environmental quality based on the perspective of definition of public goods. The multiple characteristics of area,regional and national of the environmental quality,which provide a theoretical basis of government intervention. The article analyzes the influential mechanism of environmental quality in China from the perspectives of＂vertical financial competition＂and＂horizontal financial competition＂. The findings show that there are some defects of system design in China,such as a non-symmetric responsibility between financial revenue and expenditure,unreasonable transfer payment system,financial ＂Leviathan ＂ tendency and so on,thus squeezing the financial input of environmental quality. Meanwhile,because of＂horizontal fiscal competition＂,governments at all levels try to maximize its own disposable financial resources,which causes the local government to slack its responsibility on environmental quality,such as＂pollution game＂,＂financial investment game＂and＂pollution behavior modification game ＂ on environmental quality. In the absence of effective external constraints, non-cooperative game equilibrium state is finally presented. Thus,both the ＂vertical fiscal competition＂and ＂horizontal fiscal competition＂have a strong negative effect on China＇s environmental quality. To solve these problems,we should clear the responsibility of government at all levels on environmental quality,increase transfer payments on environmental protection,build a scientific environmental taxes（ fees） system,and establish the quality-oriented evaluation mechanism of government performance,which in turn promotes fiscal competition returning to rationality among governments,and ensurs environmental quality.