基于网络销售的食品安全信号博弈分析

Signaling Game Analysis on Safety of Food Sale Online

网购已成为人们购买食品的重要方式,然而因其相较于实体店交易时更为突出的是市场信息不对称问题,致使网络销售食品安全负面信息频现,其安全问题也越来越受到关注。通过建立博弈模型,分析网络食品经营者与消费者之间的动态信号博弈,探讨政府监管部门、网络食品经营者和其他买家的信号传递有效性。基于此,提出在我国消费者食品安全性辨识度较低且网络销售食品难以维权的现状下,可以通过完善监管立法、探索经营者市场准入条件制度、完善安全风险检验检测体系和建立健全信用评价体系来有效传递网络销售食品安全信息,促使网络食品经营者生产销售安全食品并维护消费者合法权益。

Shopping online has become an important way for people to purchase food. However,the market information is more asymmetric than shopping in store makes negative safety information of food sale online arise frequently and people pay more and more attention to food safety. Through the establishment of game model,the dynamic signaling game between food network operator and consumer is analyzed and the effectiveness of signal transfer from government regulators,food network operators and other food buyers is discussed. Moreover, considering the current situation that the consumers are hard to identify the safety of food and defend the rights, the measures that perfecting the legislation, exploring the market access conditions for operators,improving the safety risk inspection system and establishing the credit evaluation system are put forward to promote food network operators to produce and sell safe food and protect legal rights of consumers.