摘要
为防止经营者集中产生排除、限制市场竞争的效果,世界上绝大多数司法辖区都要求达到申报标准的经营者集中事先进行反垄断申报,经反垄断执法机构批准后方可实施。除取得资产所有权和经营者合并以外,在取得股权及类似权益的情形下,原本相互独立的市场竞争力量之间是否发生集中的判断标准相对模糊,界定拟议交易是否属于经营者集中存在较大的不确定性,我国的经营者集中反垄断立法和执法也面临如何消除这种不确定性的问题。考察各司法辖区的解决之道,发现不同界定模式背后有不同的法律传统、现行法律体系和执法机制等背景和原因。我国应以《反垄断法》第20条为基础,通过《反垄断法》的配套立法对"控制权"和"施加决定性影响"做出混合模式的阐释,根据执法经验和数据统计界定取得"施加决定性影响"的最低量化标准,增强法律实施的确定性,提高执法效率,降低申报成本,节约执法资源。
In most jurisdictions it is required that concentrations which meet certain thresholds be notified before closing, and can be implemented only upon approval by antitrust authorities, in order to prevent the elimination or reduction of market competition by concentrations. In cases of acquiring shares or other similar interests, other than acquisition of assets or mergers between undertakings, there are no clear criteria on whether a concentration has occurred between previously independent market players l creating great uncertainty as to whether a proposed transaction constitutes a concentration. Such uncertainty presents a challenge in the antimonopoly legislation and law enforcement in China. This article catalogues three approaches to address this problem, based on a review of practices in different jurisdictions, trying to reveal the disparities in legal traditions, legal systems and enforcement mechanisms that account for the three models. This article proposes that control and decisive influence under the Antimonopoly Law should be further clarified by following the mixed model in implementing regulations. Specifically this can be done by adopting a minimum quantitative standard for decisive influence derived from actual enforcement and data analysis. This approach will increase the accuracy and efficiency in law enforcement, reduce notification costs and save administrative resources.
出处
《中国法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第5期223-247,共25页
China Legal Science