基于主从博弈的交直流混联系统主动防御策略设计

Stackelberg game model for active defending strategy in hybrid AC/DC power system

随着电网规模的扩大化与系统元件的复杂化,特别是交直流混联输电格局的逐步形成,系统安全稳定问题也日益严重。准确确定电网脆弱源,并制定相应防御策略以预防大停电事故的发生变得至关重要。本文针对交直流混联系统提出了主动防御策略制定的主从博弈模型,即D-A-D(防御者-进攻者-防御者)三层规划模型。上层模型制定电力系统防御策略,中层模型确定并发故障元件集合,而下层模型模拟系统故障后的安全调度过程。上述模型可先转换为下层为混合整数线性规划的双层模型,后采用枚举树算法求解。在IEEE30节点系统中进行仿真分析,验证了上述模型的合理性与有效性。

With the hybrid AC / DC power system gradually coming into being,the security of the system is increasingly important. It is essential to identify the vulnerable components and to make defending strategies to prevent cascading failures. This paper proposes a Stackelberg game model for active defending strategy in AC / DC power system,i. e. D-A-D tri-level programming model. The upper-level model determines the active defending strategy,the middle decides the multiple contingencies,and the lower represents the security dispatch process. This model can be transformed into a bi-level model whose lower-level is a mixed integer linear programming problem. Thus it can be solved by an enumeration tree algorithm. Simulations and analysis have been conducted in an IEEE 30 bus system to prove its rationality and validity.