问责与履职:地方政府食品安全监管行为的实证研究

Accountability and Performance:An Empirical Study of the Behaviors of Food Safety Supervision of Local Government

学界主流的观点认为"多头监管"体制下,问责失效是导致食品安全监管体制失败的主要原因。而在"冗余"的视角下,重复的组织设计却可以增加组织的稳定性。所以问责与食品安全监管体制下地方政府履职的关系有待进一步理论探讨和实证性检验。通过梳理有关"多头管理"体制利弊之争的研究文献,并在其基础上,对问卷数据进行统计分析以及最小二乘法(OLS)分析,实证检验表明:在现行的"多头监管"体制下,问责与地方政府履职行为存在着较强的关联性,从而对传统的认识予以了有力的反击。

The academic mainstream view is that the failure of accountability is the main reason leading to the failure of food safety supervision system in the multi-agent regulation system,but in the perspective of＂redundancy＂,the repeated organizational design can increase the stability of an organization.So the relationship between accountability and the performance of local governments in the food safety supervision system needs further theoretical discussion and empirical tests.Through combing the literature about the advantages and disadvantages of the multi-agent regulation system,and establishing an OLS model of the questionnaire data,the empirical test shows that there is a strong correlation between accountability and the performance of local governments duties under the multi-agent regulation system.Thereby this result gives the traditional view a strong counterattack.