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商业补充医疗保险逆向选择问题研究——基于CHARLS数据的实证检验 被引量:19

A Study on Adverse Selection of Supplemental Commercial Medical Insurance:Evidence Based on CHARLS Data
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摘要 本文利用"中国健康与养老追踪调查"2011年基线调查数据,选取个人健康风险有关变量,通过描述性统计分析、Logit模型、Probit模型以及Biavairate Probit等计量分析方法,对我国商业补充医疗保险逆向选择问题进行了检验。研究发现患有慢性病与购买保险存在微弱正相关关系;拥有商业补充医疗保险的群体集中于高学历人群;没有发现商业补充医疗保险促进医疗服务利用的证据。本文认为我国商业补充医疗保险市场存在信息不对称现象,但逆向选择的效应十分微弱。 In this thesis, "China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study"2011 Baseline Data was used to test the adverse selection problem of supplemental medical insurance, risks through descriptive statistical analysis and e- conometric analysis such as Logit model, Probit model and Bivariate Probit model. The study found only a weak posi- tive correlation between the presence of chronic diseases and insurance purchasing;those who owned supplemental medical insurance were mostly highly educated;there was no obvious evidence for supplemental medical insurance to promote the use of medical services. This thesis argued that there was information asymmetry in supplemental medical insurance market, but the effect of adverse selection was very weak.
作者 薄海 张跃华
出处 《保险研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第9期65-81,共17页 Insurance Studies
基金 "中国保险学会教保人身保险高校课题研究基金" "国家自然科学基金面上项目(71373228)" 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2014QNA206)联合资助
关键词 医疗保险 补充医疗保险 逆向选择 CHARLS数据 商业保险 medical insurance supplemental medical insurance adverse selection CHARLS Data commercial insurance
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