政府行为、风险感知与巨灾保险需求的关联性研究

The Relationship among Government Behavior,Risk Perception and Catastrophe Insurance Demand

本文以地震风险为研究对象,以投保意愿与支付意愿作为巨灾保险需求的两个代理变量,并以楚雄州681个农户作为研究样本,从防灾减灾中的政府行为与风险感知两个维度实证检验了巨灾保险需求机制背后蕴藏的"慈善危害"(Charity Hazard)与风险感知效应。结果发现,防灾减灾中政府的工程预防行为会显著降低个人的巨灾保险需求,政府的非工程行为与灾后救助没有表现出"危害"效果,反而起到了促进作用。进一步研究发现,风险感知水平与巨灾保险需求呈现显著的正相关关系,但其对巨灾保险需求的作用力会受到政府行为的削减。这些结果表明,政府在灾害救助中的职能与个体巨灾风险感知对巨灾保险制度的建立和完善具有重要意义。

Based on the Willingness-to-Insure（ WTI） and Willingness-to-Pay（ WTP）,this paper tests the effects of public catastrophe risk mitigations and individual risk perception on the demand for catastrophe insurance using the contingent valuation survey method among 716 farmers in Chuxiong,Yunnan. The results show that government ＇s engineering mitigation has negative effect on catastrophe insurance demand,but non-engineering mitigation and disaster relief are opposite. Further research indicates that catastrophe risk perception is an important determinant of insurance demand,which will be weakened by government risk mitigations. This paper demonstrates that the current public risk mitigation and individuals＇ risk perception play a key role in catastrophe insurance system.