摘要
本文选取2008-2012年A股上市公司为样本,研究家族控制,双重委托代理冲突对公司投资效率的影响。研究发现,相比非家族控制的企业,家族控制的企业,具有更严重的投资不足的现象。双重委托代理冲突对投资不足有显著的正向影响并且在家族控制的企业里影响更强烈。实证结果说明基于双重委托代理冲突的家族控制是导致了公司投资不足重要原因之一。本文结论为理解家族控制公司的价值偏低现象提供了一个途径。
This study examines the relation between family control, double agency cost and firm＇s investment efficiency. Using a sample of A-share listed companies during 2008 and 2012, this paper document that family controlled firms have higher under-investment inefficiency than that of non-family controlled firms and both the agency problem between managers and owners and between controlling and minority shareholders in family controlled firms are positively associated with firm＇s under-investment levels. The results of our study are robust after several specifications and provide empirical evidence to understand the investment efficiency problems in family controlled firms.
出处
《投资研究》
2015年第5期4-17,共14页
Review of Investment Studies
