上市公司广告支出披露与内部人收益

Disclosure of Advertising Expenditures and Insider Earnings in China's Listed Firms

本文研究信息不对称条件下上市公司广告支出披露对内部人收益的影响。我们以2007年到2012年之间中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,发现无广告支出披露公司的内部人买入收益显著较高,即控制了其他因素后无广告支出披露公司的内部人买入年化收益率高出自愿披露广告支出的公司10.38%。此外,本文还发现投资者对无广告支出披露公司的内部人买入消息的反应更强烈,很可能是因为投资者认为无广告支出披露公司的内部人买入消息的信息含量更多。因此本文认为,广告支出披露一定程度上减少了外部人和内部人之间的信息不对称并降低了内部人收益。

This paper studies the impact of advertising expenditures disclosure on insider earnings under information asymmetry. Using the data of China＇s Shanghai ＆ Shenzhen A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2012, we find that insiders in undisclosing firms earn 10.38% higher yearly than those in disclosing firms. We also find that investors respond more intensively to buying news of insiders in undisclosing firms, probably because investors think buying news of insiders in undisclosing firms is more informative. Therefore, disclosure of advertising expenditures might reduce information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders and thus lower insiders eamingst.