财政分权和地方政府竞争视角下我国出口增长的制度解释:理论与实证研究

Institutional Explanation of China's Export Growth in Perspective of Fiscal Decentralization and Local Government Competition: A Theoretical and Empirical Research

财政分权和地方政府竞争是我国经济转型发展的两个重要制度特征,本文研究了它们对我国出口增长的促进机制。动态博弈模型分析表明,中央政府给予地方政府的留存税收比例越高,即财政分权程度越高,会导致地方企业选择出口;地方政府竞争激烈程度提高也有相同效应。这两者从转型经济特有的制度层面共同解释了我国出口整体高速扩张的制度背景。我国省级动态面板数据的系统GMM估计结果也验证了财政分权和地方政府竞争促进了各省份出口的增长,并且这种促进作用在选择不同控制变量、采取差分GMM和混合回归估计等情况下保持稳健。

Fiscal decentralization and local government competition are two important institutional features of China＇ s economic transformation and develop- ment, and this paper studies on the improvement effect of the two factors on Chi- na＇ s export growth. The dynamic game model analysis states that a higher ratio of saved tax of local government allowed by national government, which means a higher degree of fiscal decentralization, will drive local firms to export; and the more intense local government competition also has a similar effect. These two factors combined explain the institutional background of the fast expansion of China＇ s export from the perspective of the unique institution of China＇ s transforming economy. The SYS-GMM estimation of China＇ s provincial dynamic panel data also proves that fiscal decentralization and local government competi- tion improve the provincial export, and the improvement effect is robust with dif- ferent control variables and under different estimation methods including DIF- SYS and the pooled regression method.