摘要
2014以来的煤炭严峻形势,说明煤炭供过于求的矛盾不仅没有缓解,反而在进一步加剧。尽管原因是多方面,但就煤炭行业自身来讲,限制煤炭超能力生产应该是最有效的自救措施,遗憾的是煤炭超能力问题一直严重存在。就此问题从有关不同利益主体超能力生产博弈解释这一救市政策落空原因。
The severe situation since 2014 has proved that the contradiction between the supply of coal is not only no relief,but in the further intensification. Although there are many reasons, but for the coal industry itself, to limit the capacity of coal production should be the most effective self-help measures. Unfortunately, the problem has been a serious problem of coal all the time. The article intends to explain this problem from the game on the different interests of the main body of the super capacity to explain why the rescuing policy fails.
出处
《煤炭经济研究》
2015年第9期37-44,56,共9页
Coal Economic Research
基金
陕西省教育厅财政专项资助课题(15JK1167)
关键词
煤炭救市
超能力生产
博弈
coal rescue policy
super capacity production
game