银行高管薪酬、贷款业务与风险承担

Bank CEO Compensation,Lending Business and Risk-taking

利用2005-2013年16家上市银行的面板数据,采用联立方程组和三阶段最小二乘法(3SLS),从静态和跨期两个维度实证分析银行高管薪酬结构与高管风险倾向,以及高管薪酬、贷款业务与风险承担的关系。研究结果表明,我国上市商业银行与业绩挂钩的薪酬结构体系,导致银行高管更愿意冒险,为获得高薪酬而从事高风险的贷款业务,导致银行风险承担增加;在风险大的银行里,高管更容易扩张贷款业务,获得更高的薪酬;高管薪酬、贷款业务与风险承担之间存在着跨期的关系,上一年的薪酬支付、业务规模、风险控制等因素影响当年的高管决策。

This paper investigates the static and intertemporal relationships between CEO compensation, lending business and risk - taking from the perspective of compensation structure and managers＇ risk prefer- ence using the panel data of 16 listed Chinese commercial banks from 2005 to 2013 and three - stage least squares （3SLS） procedures. We find that commercial bank CEO has higher risk -taking incentive in response to the performance related compensation system. Managers engage in risker lending business and extend loan size to gain higher compensation which results in greater risk. In a commercial bank with higher risk, the man- ager is easier to extend lending business to obtain higher compensation. In addition, CEO compensation, lend- ing business and risk - taking has intertemporal relationships, which means previous payment, business scale, risk control and so on affects the CEO＇s current decision.