协作失灵、精英行为与农民合作秩序的演进

Coordination Failure,Elite Behavior and the Evolution of Farmers' Cooperation Order

乡村精英的小集团行动和资源互补性造成的协作失灵,是当前农民合作社泛松散化的原因。普遍存在的精英依赖可能为上述问题提供了一个"精英解"。精英二元效用模型表明,合作社精英不仅追求经济收益(利己),还看重声望、成就感等社会收益(利他),其行为具有利他利己二元特征。精英的利他行为有助于推动合作社走出低水平均衡陷阱。不过,合作社经营状况的改善会使精英更看重经济收益进而谋求更高的分配比例,"精英侵占"开始出现。幸运的是,不断增加的社会收益可以进一步激发精英的利他选择,推动实现"利益共享、风险共担"的高水平合作。因此,政府应强化精英的利他行为,促进农民合作秩序演进。

The cause of the farmer cooperatives＇ loose development in China is the rural elite group action and coordination fail- ure caused by resource complementarity. The generally dependent on elites may offer an ＂elite solution＂ for this problem. The dual utility model shows that the elites in cooperatives pursue not only the economic benefits but also prestige, achievability and other so- cial benefits. Their behavior possesses the dual characteristics of altruism and self-interest. Elite altruistic behavior could guide co- operative out of the low-level equilibrium trap. However, the improvement in operating conditions of cooperative will make the elite attach more importance to economic benefits and seek higher allocation proportion. The outcome is usurped by the elite. Fortunate- ly, the increasing social benefits could further stimulate their altruistic behavior, and conduce to achieve the ＂benefit-sharing risk- sharing＂ high levels of cooperation. So the government should take some measures to strengthen the altruistic behavior of elites, pro- mote the evolution of farmers＇ cooperation order.