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机构持股与公司现金分红行为研究 被引量:3

Institutional Shareholder and Cash Dividend
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摘要 本文以2008~2012年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了机构持股与现金分红之间的关系。研究表明,保险公司和基金公司积极影响公司现金分红政策的制定,对现金分红行为具有显著激励效应;在全样本和国有控股公司中,社保基金对上市公司分红意愿和分红水平具有激励效应,而在非国有控股公司中,社保基金对公司分红水平具有激励效应,对公司分红意愿不具有激励效应。本文从机构投资者参与公司治理视角,拓展了自由现金流量理论。 This paper empirically examines the relationship between institutionalholding and dividend behaviors by employing the sample of A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock Exchange from 2008 to 201212We find that: insurance firms and funds firms actively participate in the development of cash dividend policy, and they have significant incentive effects for dividend behavior; In the full sample and the state-owned holding firms, social security funds have significant incentive effects on the will of dividends and the level of dividends in the listed firms; In the non-state-owned holding firms, social security funds have significant incentive effects on the level of dividends, but have no significant incentive effects on the will of dividends in the listed firms. From institutional investors activism perspective, the paper extends the free cash flow theory.
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第10期55-60,共6页 Securities Market Herald
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71172190)
关键词 自由现金流量 机构持股 现金分红 free cash flow, institutional holding, cash dividend
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