高管薪酬激励、管理层持股与盈余管理偏好——基于对盈余管理方式的全景式考察

Compensation Incentive,Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management Preference——Based on Earnings Management Thorough Investigation

薪酬激励是缓解代理问题的重要手段,但可能引发高管的盈余管理行为。不同盈余管理方式各有特点,在薪酬激励下高管对不同盈余管理方式可能存在偏好,管理层持股可能会影响高管在薪酬激励下的盈余管理偏好。研究发现:(1)薪酬激励强度越大,高管越偏好采用操控性应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理,但薪酬激励会显著抑制高管利用非经常性损益实施盈余管理的行为;(2)管理层持股增强了薪酬激励下高管采用操控性应计盈余管理的偏好,弱化了高管采用真实盈余管理的偏好,但管理层持股不会改变薪酬激励下高管抑制非经常性损益盈余管理的偏好。

Incentive for executives based on performance is an important mean to ease the problem of agency. However, it could cause executives＇ earnings management. Under the compensation incentive, executives＇ behaviors may vary with respect to different earning management. Managerial ownership on one hand can fuse the conflicts and differences in objectives between shareholders and executives, on the other hand can also strengthen the power of management. As a result, management equity can affect executives＇ earnings manage- ment preference. The study＇ s findings include： （ 1 ） The more intensity compensation incentive is, the more likely executives employ discre- tionary accrual earnings management and real earnings management; Moreover, the intensity of compensation incentive can inhibit the executives from extraordinary profit and loss of earnings management behavior. （2）Managerial ownership enhances the preference for dis- cretionary accrual earnings management and weakens the preference for real earnings management; However, managerial ownership makes no difference to extraordinary profit and loss of earnings management behavior. Our findings shed light on the executive compensation incentive and the risk of earnings management.