国家出资人代表激励机制立法研究

The Legislation on Prompting Institution of Representatives of State investors in Enterprise

公司中经国资委委派或推选的董事与监事,负有公法上特定的国资经营监督职责,实质为国资委代表国家委派的公务代表,其激励当符合国家公职人员的相关原理及规则。然而,当前的制度设计基于其公司董监事的私法身份,依据经济学上以私有产权为基础的委托代理理论,建立了以市场化激励为主导的激励机制,使其异化为公司的普通董监事而丧失了应有的功能。对此,需从法学的视角反思其理论基础,明确国资委与其董监事代表人之间公法上的委任与代表关系,构建以履行公务职责为中心的激励机制,回归对其公务激励的本来面目。

The prompting of the directors and supervisors, who are elected by States＇ stock hold- ers and have special responsibility on operating and supervising the national asset in enterprises, should follow the rules and principles of that of national officer. However, the running prompting in- stitution is based on the private statues and the authorizing theory by marketing, which makes them only burden the obligation of ordinary directors and supervisors. We should rethink the theoretical bases, identify the relation between States＇ stock holders and directors and supervisors, and erect the prompting system focus on public duty to fulfill the duty of public prompting.