信息披露最优化与交易效率——一个弱势个体与强势个体交换的例证

Information Disclosure Optimization and Transaction Efficiency:A Case on Exchange Between Weak Individuals and Strong Individuals

本文以中小企业融资市场为例,应用数理模型揭示了弱势个体通过集体形式披露信息从而提高交易效率的微观机理。研究发现,弱势个体在同强势个体进行交易时,不仅存在信息披露最优化问题,还存在着规模效应不足的问题,这致使两者在现实中难以实现交易。研究表明:1.一定程度上信息不对称能使弱势个体与强势个体在交易中实现双赢;2.弱势个体在无法正常披露信息时,通过捆绑以强势集体形式披露信息,不仅可以改善强弱双方的信息不对称状况,而且可以把弱势个体隐匿型信息内部化,以利于同强势个体交易,从而提高交易效率;3.集体披露信息机制还能够创造规模效应。

Based on SMEs financing market in China,a mathematical model is constructed to reveal the disadvantaged individual disclosure information mechanism in the collective form under the condition of information asymmetry.It is found that not only there is information disclosure optimization,but also there exists the problem of insufficient scale effect when exchanging between strong individuals and weak individuals,therefore,in real life,they exchange difficultly.The research shows that,to certain extent,information asymmetry can make vulnerable individuals with a strong individual achieve win-win situation in the course of exchange.When disadvantaged individuals could not normally disclosure information,they can bind together and disclosure information in strong collective form.Thus it improves the condition of the information asymmetry in both sides,the collective disclosure of information also can make the disadvantaged individuals information internal in order to exchange easily with strong ones.Furthermore,it can create scale effect.