摘要
网络团购近些年在中国发展迅速,已经成为一种主流的电子商务消费模式.随着消费者权益保护意识的增强,越来越多的问题亟待团购网站解决,退款问题就是其中之一.在静态定价机制的前提下,构建单个团购网站和单个商家组成的二级主导型供应链模型,在微观经济学理性经济人的假设下,参考stackelberg利润分配博弈理论,研究团购网站执行不同退款策略时商家和网站的最优利润分配策略.并经过算例分析后,给出当消费者和市场具有不同特征时,团购网站的最佳退款策略.
In recent years,online group-buying is developing rapidly,which has become one of the main e-commerce models.With the growth of consumer awareness to protect their rights and interests,more and-more problems need to be solved by group-buying websites.Refund problem is a key issue.On the premise of static pricing mechanism,this article compared two common refund policy on the market based on the theoretical model and numerical example.Through the study of the two refund policy,this article found that when other conditions are unchanged,refund strategy need to be decided according to the characteristics of the consumers.When the consumers are very sensitive and with strong sense of rights protection,group-buying websites should refund to the customer who has not consumed,in order to attract more consumers and thus achieve profit maximization.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2015年第19期293-300,共8页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(71203218)
国家自然科学基金(71172199)
关键词
网络团购
退款策略
静态定价
online group-buying
refund strategy
static pricing mechanism