异质委托情境下国企高管自利行为对激励契约的影响分析

Analysis on the Influence of Executives' Self-interest Behavior on Incentive Contract in the Context of Heterogeneous Agent

该文在国有企业异质委托情境下,引入国企高管在职消费和隐藏收益自利行为,分析了代理人不同自利行为对政府股东和社会股东纳什均衡合同中最优激励契约设计的影响。通过理论模型发现,国企高管在职消费自利行为提高了异质委托情境下促进政治努力的纳什均衡合同最优激励系数,对促进经济努力的纳什均衡合同没有影响,隐藏收益自利行为降低了异质委托情境下促进经济努力的纳什均衡合同最优激励系数,对促进政治努力的纳什均衡合同没有影响;从代理人的努力类型来看,在职消费自利行为提高了自身的政治努力水平,隐藏收益行为的外部监督强度降低了自身的经济努力水平,不同自利行为对不同努力类型起到了一定的自我激励作用。研究结论为我国国有经济推进混合所有制改革,加强国有企业巡视工作等外部监督制度以及完善国企高管薪酬制度的制定提供一定的理论参考。

In the context of heterogeneous agent of state-owned enterprises, this study introduced the self-interest behavior of on-duty consumption and hidden income of state-owned enterprises＇ executives, and analyzed the impact of agents＇ different self-interest behavior on the optimal incentive contract design of the Nash equilibrium contracts between governmental and social shareholders. The theoretical model reveals that the on-duty consumption self-interest behavior of executives of state-owned enterprises helps to improve the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent, while has no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort. The self-interest behavior of hidden income decreases the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent, while has no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort. Viewing from the agents ＇ effort type, on-duty self-interest behavior improves their own level of political effort; the external supervision strength of hidden benefit behavior reduces their economic effort level; and different self-interest behavior play a certain role in self motivation for different types of efforts. The conclusion of this study provides certain theoretical reference for promoting mixed ownership reform of the state-owned economy for our country, strengthening external supervision system of the inspections on state-owned enterprises and improving the drafting of salary system for executives of state-owned enterprises.