基于信号传递理论的农村土地经营权抵押贷款研究

Study on Rural Financing With Mortgage of Land Management Rights Based on Signaling Model

通过建立信号博弈模型,量化分析了土地经营权抵押贷款模式对解决农村金融机构与农业经营主体间信息不对称问题的有效性。并结合农行钟祥支行开展此项业务模式的试点经验进行了实证研究,证明在配套环境尚不完善的情况下,该业务基于信号传递在一定程度上解决了少数优质新型农业经营主体贷款难的问题,但对于增强大多数农户的信贷可得性仍难以发挥作用。最后从完善农村产权法律制度基础、搭建完善的农村产权交易平台、培育专业的土地价值评估机构、健全风险补偿机制四个方面提出建议,以推广该信贷业务,防范风险,增强大多数农户的信贷可得性。

Through establishing a signaling game model, this paper quantitatively analyzes the effectiveness of a new type of rural financing mode with mortgage of land management rights in solving the information asymmetry among rural financial institutions and agricultural businesses. Then it carries out a case study on the pilot experi- ence of Zhongxiang branch of Agricultural Bank of China, which demonstrates that, in the imperfect supporting environment, it can solve in a certain extent the difficult problem of loan for the high-quality new types of agricul- tural businesses based on the signal transmission. But it is still difficult to play a role for the majority of farmers to enhance the availability of credit. Finally, in order to promote the credit business, prevent risk, and strengthen the majority of farmers~ credit availability, it suggests that the legal system foundation of rural property rights, rural property rights trading platform, the professional agencies of the land value assessment, and the risk compensation mechanism should be established or improved.