知识的确证与心灵的限度

Knowledge Justification and the Limits of Mind

当代知识论中,内在主义与外在主义一直被视为两个重要而又对立的范畴,本文从心灵哲学的视角分析了二者的理论困境及其破产症结,即无论知识的确证取决于使其为真的外部世界还是主体的内在状态,都暗含了一个预设——它们是先天预成的,其特性不会随着信念的改变而发生变化,于是似乎我们只能在两者之间做非此即彼的选择。但这个预设本身就是有问题的,它静态地看待认知的某些结果,而完整的知识确证需要从原初形式的认识开始,考察它们的起源并追踪它们的发展层次和趋向。从某种意义上说,我们关于外界的感知是一种始于内心信念的世界模型,但模型会根据预测状况与实际情形的偏差不断进行调整和修正。经验是对我们的感觉的自然的现实化,而概念性能力不可或缺地包含在我们的感觉的自然中。按照这样的思路,如果我们找出内/外在论在认知过程的不同层级和脉络里得以运作的那些方式,那么它们在很多方面不再是相互排斥的,而可以实现融合或达成一致。

Internalism and Externalism has been seen as two important and opposing category in the contemporary theory of knowledge. This article analyze the plight and crux of both theory from the point of view of mind philosophy. That is to say, whether the justification of knowledge depends on external world or internal state of subject, knowledge is preformed preliminarily, the characteristics of which do not change with the variety of belief. But this preset is doubtful in itself which treats some of the results of cognition statically. But the adequate knowledge comes from the original form of cognition, which requires the inquiry on its origins and tracing of its development and trends. In a sense, our perception about the outside world is a world model beginning with inner conviction, but the model will make adjustments and amendments according to deviation of forecast from the actual situation. Along the way of thinking, the internalism and externalism can achieve unity or agreement during the cognitive processes either on certain levels or in certain context.