成本不对称、横向兼并与部分默契合谋

Cost Asymmetry,Horizontal Merger and Partial Tacit Collusion

本文在厂商成本不对称、不允许单边支付和简单的两阶段最优惩罚策略的条件下,分析了中间厂商间的横向兼并对部分默契合谋的影响,结果发现:一项可以增进行业内大厂商间资产规模/成本对称性却又对最大厂商和最小厂商的地位不构成影响的横向兼并,虽然可显著改进兼并厂商的效率,增加生产者剩余,但更重要的是,它不仅将引发合谋效应,形成部分合谋,而且同时还将产生显著的单边效应;最小厂商的规模越大或成本越低,部分合谋的价格上涨效应与消费者福利下降效应都将在一定程度上得到抑制或减弱。这表明,标准合谋理论的洞见是正确的,横向兼并的协调效应并非像学者们想象的那么低。

Based on the hypotheses of cost asymmetry, no unilateral payment and simple two-phase punishment code, the paper analyzed the effect of horizontal merger between the mid-size firms on tacit collusion, and concluded that a horizontal merger, which can enhance the asset size / cost symmetry among firms but not affect the status of the largest and smallest firms, can increase the producer surplus, facilitate partial tacit collusion and increase price, although it can get significant efficiency improvement;the larger size or the lower cost of the smallest firm, the weaker effect of price in-creasing and consumer welfare losing. It is implicated that the standard collusion theory insight is correct, therefore the coordination effect of horizontal mergers is not as low as scholars suggested.