非自愿性超额准备、货币政策与银行风险承担

Involuntary Excess Reserves,Monetary Policy and Bank's Risk-Taking

本文以2008年至2013年中国49家中资银行的相关数据为样本,构建动态面板模型分析银行非自愿性超额准备、货币政策与银行风险承担之间的关系。实证研究表明:银行非自愿性超额储备金率增加会提高与贷款相关的银行风险承担,但会降低与资产配置相关的银行风险承担;银行非自愿性超额储备金率对银行风险承担的影响会受到货币政策的作用,紧缩性货币政策会显著抑制银行非自愿性超额储备对与贷款相关的银行风险承担的正向作用,但会促进银行非自愿性超额准备金对与资产配置相关的银行风险承担的负向作用。因此,为防范银行风险积聚,监管当局应积极监测银行持有的非自愿性超额准备金情况,并应审慎针对非自愿超额准备金展开微调性操作,以防范银行风险,实现经济平稳运行。

This paper uses the relevant data of 49 Chinese commercial banks from 2008 to 2013 to explore the relation-ship among bank′s involuntary excess reserves, monetary policy stance, and bank′s risk-taking through building dynamic panel model. The empirical research shows the increasing of bank′s involuntary excess reserves ratio will promote bank risk-taking related to loan, but will also reduce bank risk-taking associated with asset allocation;the effect of bank′s in-voluntary excess reserves ratio on bank′s risk-taking will be affected by monetary policy, the easing monetary policy could significantly inhibit the positive influence of bank′s involuntary excess reserves on bank′s risk-taking related to loans, but will promote the negative effect of voluntary excess reserves on bank′s risk-taking associated with asset alloca-tion. Therefore, in order to prevent bank risk accumulation and make economy running smoothly, regulatory authorities should actively monitor bank′s involuntary excess reserves and be prudent on fine-tuning operating about it.