摘要
本文基于平台经济学的基本理论,以满足双边市场性质的三个条件为主线,对众筹平台的性质作了界定并提供了经验证据。在此基础上,从价格竞争和非价格竞争角度对众筹平台的竞争策略展开讨论,并就竞争所导致的负外部性及管控机制对最新研究进展进行了评述,从而构建了众筹平台双边市场性质的分析框架。文章通过对文献的梳理,分析了现有研究的局限,并从众筹平台双边性质的实证检验、竞争策略的动态演进以及管控的变革等三个方面指出了未来研究方向。
Based on the theories of platform economics, this paper confirms that crowd- funding platforms meet the three conditions in the nature of two-sided markets. On this basis, this paper mainly discusses competitive strategy of crowdfunding platforms from price and nonprice competitions perspectives. Moreover, it reviews the new research progress of negative externalities and platforms control caused by competition. It provides an analytical framework for two-sided markets o{ crowdfunding platforms and points out future research directions from the perspectives of empirical test on two-sided markets, dynamic develop- ment of competitive strategies and transformation of the management and control on crowd- funding platforms based on the limitations of current research.
出处
《外国经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第11期15-24,共10页
Foreign Economics & Management
基金
国家社科基金重点项目(15AJL004)
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2015ZDAXM005)
重庆市教委人文社科项目(14SKL03)
重庆三峡学院青年项目(10QN-10)
关键词
众筹平台
平台经济学
双边市场
市场失灵
crowdfunding platform
platform economics
two-sided markets
market failure