审计师会选择性地抑制盈余管理吗?——基于对非经常性损益盈余管理的实证检验

Do Auditors Have Discrimination in Suppressing Earnings Management?——Evidence from Extraordinary Profit and Loss

当审计师面对不同上市公司和不同的盈余管理方式时,其所面临的风险是不同的。为控制风险并确保收益,审计师在区分上市公司和盈余管理方式的基础上有选择地抑制,才符合其自身利益。本研究发现,在上市公司具有扭亏动机且采用了隐性盈余管理方式的情境下,审计师倾向出具标准无保留审计意见;而有扭亏动机的上市公司实施了显性盈余管理,或没有扭亏动机的上市公司实施了隐性盈余管理,审计师都倾向于出具非标准的审计意见;对于有扭亏动机的上市公司,异常审计费用加剧了上市公司利用非经常性损益进行盈余管理的隐性化程度。本研究增加了审计师选择性地抑制盈余管理的经验证据,也为完善我国市场监管规则和报表列报安排等提供了参考。

Whether auditors are willing to suppress earnings management depends on the core trade-offs of rev- enues and related risks under specific circumstances. Auditor＇ s risks vary when they face listed companies with va- rious motivations and distinct types of earnings management. In general, listed companies in China have three ways to do earnings management： 1. discretionary accrul（DA） ; 2. real earnings management（REM） ; 3. using extraordi- nary profit and loss. However, it is worth noticing that compared to the disclosure of first two ways of earnings man- agement, the current classification and disclosure of extraordinary profit and loss in China＇ s stock market is so com- plex and implicit that external users of listed companies＇ financial statements can hardly identify earnings manage- ment existing in the account ＂investment income＂, which belongs to the companies＇ extraordinary profit and loss and may be announced vaguely at the corner of listed companies＇ financial statements. As a result, the chances that earnings management to be identified by external users depend on the transparency of measures taken by listed com- panies. In other words, auditors＇ risks of being proved immoral under this specific circumstance can be relatively low. As rational economic man, auditors tend to inhibit earnings management selectively through issuing modified audit reports regarding the balance of their potential revenue against the related risk Using pooled cross-sectional data from 2009 to 2013 of China＇ s A-share market listed companies, this study fo- cus on the phenomenon that as the amount and nature of companies using earnings management vary, the chances of their receiving modified audit reports differ. This study presents empirical evidence that auditors are willing to lower their thresholds for issuing modified audit reports under the condition that listed companies have ＂anti-loss motiva- tion＂ and take implicit means to do earnings management. It is because under this circumstance, auditors can re- ceive a large amount of abnormal auditing fees while taking little risks. The other choice auditor can make is to be dismissed as they cannot meet their clients＇ demand to get unqualified audit reports. As rational suppliers in a free and competitive market, auditors are likely to be substandard to comply with their duty to suppress earnings manage- ment. On the contrary, auditors are not willing to lower their threshold when listed companies with ＂anti-loss motiva- tion＂ use obvious means to do earnings management or listed companies without ＂anti-loss motivation＂ use implicit means to do earnings management. It is because auditors have more bargaining power when they face these two kinds of clients. In a word, auditors tend to inhibit earnings management selectively under different circum- stances, The study also proves that to those listed companies with ＂anti-loss motivation＂, abnormal audit fees con- tribute to the extent of their taking implicit measures of earnings management, which may indicate the phenomenon of collusion between auditors and listed companies. The underlying contributions of this paper are as follows. First, by examining listed companies using extraordi- nary profit and loss to do earnings management, this paper provides a new perspective to answer the question ＂whether auditors are willing to suppress earnings management＂. Second, this paper discovers the fact that auditors will take companies＇ ＂anti-loss motivation＂ and ＂implicit means of earnings management＂ into consideration when they are deciding whether to issue modified audit reports to inhibit listed companies＇ earnings management. Third, the conclusions of this paper provide useful references for the departments concerned in China to further revise and improve the presentation guidelines and disclosure rules of extraordinary profit and loss of listed companies.