管理层风险激励模式、异质性与企业创新行为

Managerial Risk Incentive Patterns,Heterogeneity and Firm Innovation Behaviors

本文基于2005年世界银行关于中国企业的投资环境调查数据,考察了管理层风险激励模式和异质性对企业创新行为的影响.研究表明:1管理层风险激励是企业创新行为的重要驱动力,但对于市场化程度较高的东部地区企业而言,短期风险激励的效果要逊于长期风险激励;2管理层任期与企业创新行为之间呈现倒U形曲线关系,即管理层任期过长容易使企业陷入"记忆僵化"的困局;3政治关系抑制了企业创新行为,但市场化程度有利于弱化政治关系对企业创新行为的抑制作用;4管理层的教育水平有利于推动企业创新,但在不同地区存在一定的差异性.通过工具变量回归发现,上述主要结果具有较强的稳健性.本文的结论为中国企业成功转型过程中如何有效治理管理层提供了经验参考.

It used the World Bank survey of Chinese firms on investment climate in 2005 to empirically examine the roles of managerial risk incentives patterns and heterogeneity in a firm＇s innovation behaviors. The results show： managerial risk incentives are the important driving force of firm＇s innovation behaviors,but the effects of short term risk incentives on firm＇s innovation behaviors are inferior to long term risk incentives in eastern area with higher marketization level; the relationship between managerial tenure and firm＇s innovation behaviors follows the inverted U-shaped curve,namely,long-tenured managers will make firms sink into ＂memory rigid＂dilemma easily; political connection restrains the firm＇s innovation behaviors,but the marketization level moderate the relationships between political connection and firm＇s innovation behaviors; managerial education level helps firm to promote innovation behaviors. The main results are robust to endogeneity tests with instrumental variables. The conclusion provides a reference for Chinese firms to administrate managers effectively in its transformation process.