融资约束、资本投资与公司绩效——基于公司债自然实验的视角被引量：7

Financing Constraints, Capital Investment and Corporate Bonds in the Corporate Bond Perspective

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摘要本文基于深沪A股上市公司的微观数据,从公司债这一视角入手,采用双倍差等估计方法,考查了金融工具创新对公司外部融资约束变化及企业经营绩效的影响。实证结果表明,公司债成为企业新的融资途径后,高信用等级公司比低信用公司的销售收益率、总资产收益率和净资产收益率均显著为高。进一步研究发现,上述结论背后的作用机制在于,公司债这一金融工具创新降低了高信用等级公司资本投资对内部现金流的依赖,并且这类公司的投资规模、销售增长率和技术进步率均有显著提升。这一结论为宏观领域金融发展如何促进经济增长提供了微观证据。 In the background of corporate bonds appearing, this paper discusses the innovation of financial instrument how to affect the external financing constraints and corporate performance. Based on the panel data of listed companies, this investigation employs the DID method. The results show that the ROS, ROA and ROE of high-credit rating companies have improved significantly, since corporate bonds become potential financing tools. This paper further finds corporate bonds help to reduce the investment-cash flow sensitivity of the high credit rating companies, and enhance their investment scale, sales growth rate and technical progress ratio. The above conclusions provide microscopic evidence for the relationship between financial development and economic growth.

作者李春霞

机构地区天津财经大学经济学院

出处《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第11期44-51,共8页 Securities Market Herald

基金国家社会科学基金项目(15BJL028) 天津市哲学社会科学研究规划项目(TJYYWT15-014) 天津财经大学科研发展基金(Q140101)

关键词融资约束公司绩效资本投资公司债 financing constraints corporate performance capital investment corporate bonds

分类号 F830.9 [经济管理—金融学]

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