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政商关系的重构:商业腐败还是慈善献金 被引量:24

The Reconstruction of Business and Government Relationship:The Usage of Business Corruption or Philanthropic Giving?
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摘要 本文以2000-2012年A股上市公司为样本,实证分析官员更替对商业腐败行为的影响,以及腐败行为为企业带来的政治收益。研究发现,在市委书记更替期间,企业主要采用慈善献金方式来构建政商关系,并且挤出商业腐败,同时官员更替期间企业通过商业腐败所能获得的政治收益也降低;但是在正常年度,企业的慈善献金给通过腐败构建的政商关系披上合法的外衣,而使企业获得更高的政治回报。本文丰富了政商关系和企业政治行为方面的研究,更为深入地剖析了我国企业如何运用"红"和"黑"两种政治手段。 When government officials turn over in China, the enter- prises must make a choice between the "black" and "red" political tactics for reconstruction of Business-Politics relationship. Based on the samples of Chinese A-share companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchanges during 2000 and 2012, we col- lect the turnover data of municipal party secretaries and studied its influence on business corruption and political benefits. This article contains three parts: First, it carries out research on whether the turnover of municipal party secretaries would influence the local business corruption. Second, it researches how business corruption generates political benefits for each firm. Third, we further explore how philanthropic giving, as a "red" political tactic, would influ- ence the "black" tactic of business corruption to reconstruct Busi- ness-Politics relationship and achieve political benefits. Especially, when a municipal party secretary turns over, we consider how busi- ness corruption influences political benefits when the focal firm en- gages in philanthropic giving. Our results demonstrate that Chinese corporations integrate the means of philanthropic giving and busi- ness corruption to reconstruct Business-Politics relationship during political turnover. When municipal party secretary turns over, the enterprises depend on philanthropic giving rather than business corruption for reconstruction of Business-Politics relationship, and government subsidy which is generated by business corruption decreases. But in the normal year when without political turnover, philanthropic giving helps to legitimatize business corruption and the enterprises achieve higher government subsidies. These results remain robust in regarding to several alternative measures of key variables as well as refining of samples. This study not only enrich- es the research about the relationship between business corruption and corporate political benefits, but also offers a new direction to understand how Chinese companies integrate the "red" and "black" means of political tactics in react to political changes.
出处 《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期4-17,共14页 Nankai Business Review
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71372065 71272002)资助
关键词 商业腐败 慈善献金 官员更替 政商关系 政府补贴 Business Corruption Philanthropic Giving OfficialTurnover Business-Politics Relationship Government Subsidy
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