地方主导、增长亲和与环境污染——基于1990～2012年省级碳排放数据的实证检验

Local Dominant,Pro-growth and Environment Pollution

地方政府是理解中国环境污染的着力点，地方主导型经济增长与地方主导型环境治理对环境污染具有强化作用。理论分析表明，中国式财政分权下的双重激励与相关制度缺位是地方政府过度经济增长亲和的根源。为实现快速增长，地方政府有内在的倾向放松环境管制，而污染治理支出不足则造成环境污染加剧。为有效证明上述观点，本文利用我国1990—2012年省级碳排量面板数据进行系统GMM实证检验，分析财政分权对环境污染具有显著的正效应，且得出经济发展水平与碳排放量之间存在EKC假说。

It＇s necessary to understand China＇s environmental pollution from the perspective of local governments, for lo- cal-led economic growth and environment governance strengthen the environmental pollution. Theoretical analysis shows that the dual incentives and the absence of supervision system under Chinese-style fiscal decentralization are the root causes of local growth aglnity. To achieve rapid growth, the local government has the inherent tendency to relax environmental regulation, and lack of pollution control spending, which result in environmental pollution. To effectively prove the above point of view, the article uses system GMM empirical test with 1990 -2012 provinces carbon emissions panel data to analysize that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on environmental pollution, and obtain EKC hypothesis between economic development and carbon emissions.