政治关联、盈余管理与审计师选择

Political Connection, Earnings Management and Auditor Choice

在将盈余管理按操纵利润的方向不同细分为正向和负向盈余管理,并详细探讨了正、负向盈余管理的性质、适用范围及其给注册会计师带来的法律风险差异的基础上,对政治关联企业审计师选择的策略进行了重新审视和研究。研究发现,政治关联企业在正向和负向盈余管理上均表现出高于非政治关联企业的利润操纵行为。负向盈余管理的政治关联企业更倾向于选择大所,同时,大所也有更高的可能对其财务报告签发清洁审计意见。相反,正向盈余管理的政治关联企业更偏好聘请小所,且小所也愿意对其财务报告出具标准审计意见。

On the basis of dividing the earnings management into positive and negative earnings management according to the different directions of profit manipulation and discussing in details the nature and application scope of the positive and negative earnings management as well as their legal risk differences on the CPAs, this paper re-examines and studies the strategies for auditor choice in politically connected enterprises. The results show that either in their positive or negative earnings management the politically connected enterprises have more profit manipulation behaviors than the non-politically connected enterprises. The politically connected enterprises with negative earnings management tend to choose big auditing firms; meanwhile, the big auditing firms are much more likely to issue clear auditor opinions to their financial reports. In contrast, the politically connected enterpris- es with positive earnings management are more inclined to engage small auditing firms, and the small auditing firms are quite ready to provide standard auditing opinions to their financial reports.