摘要
栗谷的人心道心说在韩国儒学中居于中心地位。首先从形而上学的角度、动机的角度界定了栗谷哲学中人心、道心的概念;接着考察了道心、人心的价值属性,指出道心是纯善的,而人心则发生了由恶到不是恶、再到有善有恶的变化,变化的关键在于人心与人欲的关系;在此基础上,认为李栗谷对道心人心之关系的看法经历了一个从对立论到统一论发展,前者表现为人心道心相为始终说,而后者表现为道心为主人心听命说。两种善问题,是李栗谷人心道心说所遇到的最大问题。该说和朱熹人心道心思想的晚年定论——善的一本说(一种善)——是明显对立的,对困难的解决有赖于回归朱熹的人心通孔说,从而把作为现实化的人心转变为作为潜能的人心。
Yulgok Lee's theory of human mind and moral mind is playing a central role in Confucianism in Korea. From the angle of view of metaphysics and motivation, the paper defines the concepts of human mind and moral mind. This article examines the value attribute of moral mind and human mind and tells that the former is pure good, but the latter has some changes, which evolves from the evil to not evil, and to has good and evil. The treatise tells us that the relationship between human mind and moral mind develops from the contrary to a unified theory, which is moral mind control human mind. Yulgok Lee's theory of moral mind and human mind encounters the biggest challenge is the problem of two kinds of goods, which means that to solve the difficulty depends on to the regression of Zhu Xi's theory of human mind is the passageway.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第11期26-34,共9页
Academic Monthly
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"政治哲学视域下的朱子研究"(2013221002)
国家社科基金项目"政治哲学视角下的先秦儒学与古典自由主义研究"(10CZX020)的阶段性成果
关键词
栗谷
人心
道心
朱子
Yulgok, human mind, moral mind, Zhu Xi