摘要
张鑫毅诉诸丘奇—哥德尔—尼尔的弹弓论证来反驳本人关于句子指称事态的结论是失效的。弹弓论证默认了共指替换和组合原则,而共指替换应该包含两种形式:整句共指替换和组合共指替换。对两者不加区分的运用会导致乞题,而且该论证无法证明所有的假句子共指。从弗雷格本人关于概念作为函数的理论出发,可以发现,"真"和"假"不是代入对象之后的概念的值,而是一个高阶函数(带断言态度的句子)的值,因此,断言态度才指称真值。
In order to refute my claim that sentences refer to states of affairs, Zhang Xinyi appeals to Church, G觟del and Neale's slingshot argument, which seems to me problematic. This argument uses the principles of the co-referential substitution and of compositionality, as to the former, we shoulddistinguish between the whole-sentence substitution and the sub-sentence substitution, or else we will beg the question. In addition, this argument fails to prove that all false sentences are co-referential.Following Frege's own theory of concept as function, 'true' and 'false' in fact are not values of concept-functions, but rather values of higher-order functions, i.e. the asserted sentences. Thus the attitude of assertion refers to truth values.
出处
《哲学分析》
2015年第5期41-50,共10页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
教育部人文社科基金2015年度规划项目(项目编号:15JA720003)"实践知性与行动动机"的阶段性成果
关键词
句子的指称
弹弓论证
共指替换原则
组合原则
概念作为函数
reference of sentence
the slingshot argument
the principle of co-referential substitution
the principle of compositionality
concept as function