摘要
为满足外部投资者随时到达网络拍卖平台购买股权的需求,建立了基于在线拍卖的风险投资退出股权交易模型,通过求解模型得到了最优股权在线拍卖机制.机制不仅可在完全未知将来投标和决策序列的情况下,立即对当前投标做出分配和支付的决策,而且能吸引外部投资者自愿参与,激励他们报告真实的股权估价信息以及到达和离开时间,并在此基础上,实现风险投资家的期望收益最大化.最后,通过一个简单算例验证了该机制的可行性和可操作性.
In order to deal with the requests of outside investors as they can buy equities at any time, a model for equities trading in VC exit based on online auction is established. The optimal equity online auction mechanism is obtained by solving this model. The mechanism not only can make allocation and payment decisions immediately about each bid as it is revealed without the knowledge of bids who will subsequently arrive, but also can attract outside investors to volunteer for the auction and incentive each outside investor to declare his truthful arrival time, valuation and depart time. And on that basis, the mechanism can maximize the venture capitalist＇s expected revenue. Finally, a simple numerical example is given to show the feasible and operability of the optimal equity online auction mechanism.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2015年第20期66-75,共10页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(71231007)
湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(14G114)
