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工程代理人员激励问题研究

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摘要 通过建立委托代理模型,本文分析了不同的激励对工程业绩指标的影响,并分析了指标间的联系作用。该模型还能够进行量化分析,避免不利因素对企业的整体业绩造成影响。工程代理人员能够通过这个模型得出其自身的报酬合同,使管理者科学地评价工程代理人员的绩效,从而能够合理地指导如何有效的衡量控制工程造价。
作者 李雪娇
出处 《管理观察》 2015年第28期80-81,84,共3页 Management Observer
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