奖惩机制下考虑销售努力的闭环供应链协调

Coordination of Closed-loop Chain with Sales Effort Under Premium and Penalty Mechanism

以一个制造商和一个零售商组成的闭环供应链为研究对象,考虑在政府的奖惩机制下需求同时受销售价格和销售努力影响的供应链协调问题.首先,在集中决策下,研究了供应链系统的最优决策,并给出了均衡解存在的条件和奖惩力度所满足的范围;在分散决策下,重点分析了奖惩力度以及销售努力对供应链双方决策的影响.其次,使用特许经营契约能够使供应链达到协调.最后,给出了数值算例和仿真分析.

This paper focuses on the coordination of closed-loop supply chain consisted of a manufacturer and a retailer ,under the assumption that product demand is a function of sales prices and sales efforts .At the time of establishing the model ,we introduce the government mechanism of premium and penalty and sales efforts .First ,under the centralized decision-making ,we study the optimal decision of the supply chain system ,and give the existence condition of the equilibrium solution and the scope of premium and penalty strength which meets the model .Under decentralized decision making ,we analyze the strength of premium and penalty ,and sales efforts how to influence decisions on both sides of supply chain .Secondly ,the study found that through appropriate parameter design ,franchising contracts can make the supply chain coordination .Finally ,a numerical example is used to illustrate the contacts and give simulation analysis .