高管权力、外部薪酬差距与公司业绩预告行为——基于中国证券市场的经验证据

Chief Executive Power,External Compensation Dispersion and Corporate Earnings Forecast Behavior——Empirical Evidence from China's Security Market

本文研究我国上市公司高管权力、外部薪酬差距对公司业绩预告行为的影响。研究发现,外部薪酬差距对公司业绩预告行为的影响基本上呈倒"U"形关系:在一定界限内对公司业绩预告行为具有激励效应,随着外部薪酬差距的增大,业绩预告信息质量提高,及时性增强,其决策有用性提高,体现为高管协同动机;超过一定界限,则具有反激励效应,随着外部薪酬差距的增大,业绩预告信息质量降低,及时性减弱,倾向性趋于保守,其决策有用性降低,体现为高管自利动机;没有证据表明高管权力影响外部薪酬差距对公司业绩预告行为的效应。进一步研究发现,随着在职消费的增大,在职消费对公司业绩预告行为的影响基本上呈倒"U"形关系。本文研究丰富了公司业绩预告行为的影响因素研究,为高管激励对公司信息披露的影响提供了新的经验证据。

This paper investigates the effect of chief executive power, external compensation dispersion on corporate earnings forecast behavior. The research evidence shows that the influence of ex- ternal compensation dispersion on corporate earnings forecast behavior is basically an inverse ＂U＂ shape rela- tionship： external compensation dispersion has incentive effect on corporate earnings forecast behavior before it reaches a cut point. With the increase of the external compensation dispersion, earnings forecast information quality and timeliness can be significantly improved. The decision usefulness of earnings forecast information is enhanced, which reflected the executive＇ s synergy motive. After this cut point, external compensation disper- sion has reverse incentive effect on corporate earnings forecast behavior. With the increase of the external com- pensation dispersion, earnings forecast information quality and timeliness can be significantly reduced, and tendency tends to be conservative, the decision usefulness of earnings forecast information is weakened, which reflected the executives self motive. The existence of chief executive power does not affect the effect of external compensation dispersion to corporate earnings forecast behavior. Further analysis shows that with the increase of perks, the influence of perks on corporate earnings forecast behavior is basically an inverse ＂U＂ shape rela- tionship. These results may enrich the determinants studies on corporate earnings forecast behavior, and pro- vide some new empirical evidence on the influence of executive incentive on company information disclosure.