基于最大一致集的合作运输联盟稳定性分析

ANALYSIS ON STABILITY OF COLLABORATIVE TRANSPORTATION COALITION WITH LARGEST CONSISTENT SET

随着油价的不断上涨以及运输市场的激烈竞争,承运人降低成本的压力不断增大.因此越来越多的承运人通过寻求与其他承运人(甚至竞争对手)进行合作运输来降低成本.文章考虑具有竞争行为的承运人之间的合作运输.首先从非合作博弈的角度分析了合作如何影响竞争的结果.然后重点利用合作博弈中最大一致集(largest consistent set,LCS)的概念分析了各种联盟结构的稳定性,讨论了承运人之间的替代率如何影响联盟的稳定形式.最后,通过数值算例分析了不同联盟结构下的社会福利情况.

With the price of oil and the pressure of reducing cost increasing, more and more carriers seek to cooperate with other carriers to reduce cost. This paper studies collaboration among carriers in transportation market, taking into account competition among carriers as well. First, this paper discusses how collaboration affects competition outcomes among carriers from the perspective of non-cooperative game theory. Then, from the perspective of cooperative game theory, the concept of largest consistent set （LCS） theory is applied to analyze the stability of different coalition structures. Particularly, this paper focuses on how substitutability affects the stable coalition structure. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate how different coalition structures affect social welfare. The results obtained in this paper not only provide some insights for carriers who need to make decisions about whether to form a coalition with other carriers, but also give the policy-makers some sense about how to regulate the transportation market so that social welfare will be optimized.