民间借贷政策规制的社会福利效应:一个分析框架

Policy Regulation of Private Lending: Theoretical Model and Realistic Choice

本文通过构建一个民间借贷规制模型来分析需求弹性和行政执法成本对规制效率的影响。模型表明:在民间借贷缺乏需求弹性时,由于高昂的禁令规制成本,对政府而言更为合适的手段是将民间借贷采取合法化、并加以征税的规制政策。在我国,除了通过"民间借贷服务中心"等机构创新来实现民间金融规范化以外,更主要地是打破金融机构市场准入高度管控的体制,允许民间资本进入金融业,使民间金融机构合法化。

This paper analyzes the effects of the demand elasticity and the cost of administrative enforcement of law on the efficiency of regulation through a model of private lending market. The research shows that： under the condition that private lending lacks demand elasticity,due to the high cost of regulation,a more appropriate method that the government should adopt is to legalize private lending and pursue a regulation policy of taxation. In China,besides using such mechanism innovation means as＂private lending service center＂to regulate private finance,the government should put more emphasis on breaking up the old system of strict regulation of market access,so as to allow private capital to enter the financial industry and legalize the private financial institutions.